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SUBDIVISION SPECIFIC AMENITIES AND RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES 





The determinants of values of residential properties have been a central concern in real estate 
research as it is important for the land owners, developers, demanders, and policy makers to 
recognize the factors that derive residential property values. In light of Lancaster’s (1966) 
consumer behavior theory, a residential property is described as a composite good consisting of 
multiple attributes that vary both in quantity and quality. Accordingly, hedonic price theory has 
become a popular operational device that functionally relates value of residential property to 
some measures of the unique attributes of the property.  
  Hedonic property value models (Freeman, 1993) assume that the sales price of a property 
represents an equilibrium price for that specific property and its uniquely associated attributes. 
Existing hedonic studies classify the attributes of a residential property into four categories – 
structural characteristics of the dwelling (e.g. size of the lot, style of the house, number of rooms 
in the house, quality of the materials and structural integrity, etc.), location specific attributes 
(e.g. distance from central business district, proximity to parks, etc.), neighborhood (socio-
economic) characteristics (e.g. quality of local schools, population density, crime rates, etc.), and 
environmental amenities (e.g. air quality). While measuring the effect of open space on 
residential property values in Maryland, Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz (2003), Irwin (2002), 
and Irwin and Bockstael (2001) identify commuting distance to the two major urban centers in 
the region as the location attributes of the property, and population density, median household 
income, the percent of population with education beyond high school, and the percent of   2
population that is African American within a 400-meter radius of residential parcels as the 
neighborhood characteristics. However, none of these studies take account of the subdivision 
specific attributes of the property. 
Following Hardie and Nickerson (2003), development of a subdivision can be defined as 
the process of converting a rural property into a set of building lots and parcels. Along with 
building lots a subdivision also includes parcels composed of open space, forests, streets, parking 
areas, swimming pools, playing fields and other non-house land units. While parcels are not 
directly purchased by homebuyers, they may affect the value that buyers are willing to pay for 
the residential property. For example, a homebuyer may be willing to pay more for an otherwise 
same house in a subdivision which has a swimming pool and/or tennis court built in it.   
This study provides a test of the hypothesis that subdivision amenities significantly affect 
residential property values. If the hypothesis could not be rejected, omission of variables 
measuring subdivision amenities could produce biased marginal values for other attributes. The 
extent of the impact of such amenities, and of other attributes, on residential property value will 
also be examined. For this purpose, a hedonic property value model will be specified and 
estimated. 
The following section of this paper specifies the hedonic property value model by 
employing a game theoretic framework. Section three discusses issues related to estimation of 
this hedonic pricing model. Section four defines the variables included in the estimated model 
and gives summary statistics for the data used in the empirical study. Empirical results are 
presented in section five. Finally, the implications of the findings and policy issues are discussed 
in a summary and conclusion section.   3
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
  Following Palmquist (1989), land conversion is assumed to occur as a result of profit 
maximizing behavior of agents who own undeveloped land parcels and make decisions regarding 
the optimal conversion of the parcels to residential use. Although separate landowners, 
developers, and builders are observed in the real world, this study hypothesizes an integrated 
landowner, developer, and builder, termed the seller hereafter, who develops a residential 
subdivision from agricultural or forest land and builds houses in it. The buyers or demanders of 
these developed residential properties are treated as renters of housing services who maximize 
utility given an exogenous income. Defining sellers and buyers in this fashion allows the 
transaction in a market for housing can be viewed a simple two-stage dynamic game of complete 
and perfect information.  
The key features of a dynamic game of complete and perfect information are that (i) the 
moves occur in sequence, (ii) all previous moves are observed before the next move is chosen, 
and (iii) the players’ payoffs from each feasible combination of moves are common knowledge 
(Gibbons, 1992). For analytical simplicity, we assume that the game is played between a 
representative seller and a representative buyer in two stages. Player one, the seller, moves first 
by choosing an action from her feasible set of actions. The seller makes the profit maximizing 
decision of building houses and other facilities in his subdivision at some specific location and 
asks for “rents” in exchange for housing services. In the second stage, player two (the buyer) 
observes the action of player one and then chooses an action from her feasible set of actions. The 
buyer observes the characteristics of the house (and its surroundings) and the rent offered by the 
seller. The buyer accepts the offer if it maximizes her utility, otherwise she rejects it. The game 
ends at this point. The payoffs to the seller and the buyer depend on both of their actions. The   4
game is assumed to be played in a single period (the possibility of repeated game is excluded 
here). If the buyer rejects the offer, she does not have the option to make a counter offer and the 
case of a new offer from the seller following a rejection of a previous offer is considered as a 
new game.  
As is true for any other dynamic game of complete and perfect information, this game 
can be solved by backwards induction. The seller first solves the buyer’s problem in the second 
stage. Following the basic hedonic property value model (Freeman, 1993) we assume that the 
buyer’s (representative individual household) utility is a function of a composite commodity X , 
lot sizel, and a vector of all other housing attributesH . We also assume that at each time τ  the 
household rents only one residential house of some type at some location and spends her entire 
income  ) (τ I over the composite good, the house, and transport costs. Under these assumptions, 
the buyer’s utility maximization problem at time τ can be formulated as: 
) , , (
, , X H l U U Max
D H X = , subject to  
) , ( ) , , , ( ) ( τ τ τ D T D H l R X I + + =        ( 2 )  
where ) (⋅ U  is the utility function,  ) (⋅ R  is the rent of a house with lot size l, and other housing 
attributes ) .. ,......... ( 1 n H H H =  at distance D from the city center at time τ ,  ) (⋅ T  is the transport 
cost per unit of time for a household at distance D at time τ , and X  is the amount of composite 
good of which price is the numeraire. The price of the numeraire good is normalized to 1. It is 
assumed that preferences are weakly separable in residential property and its characteristics. The 
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The right hand side of equation (3) gives the implicit marginal price for the housing 
characteristic at timeτ . If the buyer is assumed to be a price taker in the housing market, the 
seller can be viewed as facing an array of implicit marginal price schedules for various housing 
characteristics. In equilibrium, the marginal implicit prices associated with the house actually 
rented must be equal to the corresponding marginal willingness to pay for those characteristics.  
We assume identical buyers in the housing market (so that  ) (⋅ U  represents preferences of 
all buyers), denote the equilibrium utility level by  ) (⋅
∗ U  at timeτ ) 0 ( ∞ ≤ ≤τ , and solve 
) , , ( X H l U U = forX  in the form of ) , , ( U H l X X = . Substituting into the budget constraint 
yields the equilibrium rent of the housing ) (⋅
∗ R : 
)) ( * , , ( ) , ( ) ( ) , , , ( τ τ τ τ U H l X D D I D H l R − − =
∗      (4) 
) (⋅
∗ R  is the buyer’s best response to seller’s action. That is, if the buyer is offered the price ) (⋅
∗ R  
for the residential property with lot sizes, and other attributes H  at distance D from the city 
center at timeτ , she would accept it.  
  Since the seller can solve the buyer’s problem as well as the buyer, she can anticipate the 
buyer’s reaction to her own action. Given this “perfect foresight” the buyer would accept the 
offer ) (⋅
∗ R  at timeτ , the seller takes profit maximizing action to develop the land and build 
house units in it. Following Fajita (1982) we assume that, with perfect foresight about the future 
time paths of housing rents and agricultural land rents, the seller determines the time t when 
each unit of agricultural land at distance D is to be converted for residential use, the lot size l, 
and the characteristics of the houses to be built on the land.  
From the seller’s point of view, the attributes of a residential property can be classified 
into three major groups – building or structural attributes, subdivision specific amenities, and 
location or neighborhood characteristics. Building characteristics (e.g., size of building lots,   6
number of bathrooms, etc.) and subdivision specific attributes of the residential property (e.g., 
entrance of the subdivision, streets, open space, swimming pool, etc.) are treated as mutable 
characteristics in the sense that the seller has control over the quantities supplied. Location or 
neighborhood attributes of the residential property are immutable as the developer/builder cannot 
alter those. In addition, some other attributes of a residential property may be imposed by state or 
regional policies or acts (such as minimum lot size zoning restriction, required forest area to be 
retained or provided within the subdivision). These sorts of policy attributes act as constraints on 
the sellers’ decision making process.  
It is useful to separate  ) .. ,......... ( 1 n H H H = into four sub-vectors, including 
) .. ,......... ( ˆ
1 k H H H =  representing structural characteristics,  ) .. ,......... (
~
1 l k H H H + =  consisting of 
subdivision attributes,   ) .. ,......... ( 1 m l H H H + =  depicting location and neighborhood 
characteristics, and  ) .. ,......... ( 1 n m H H H + = &  constituting policy constraint variables. WhileH ˆ  and 
H
~
 represent mutable characteristics of a residential property, attributes represented by H  and 
H &  are exogenous in nature. Assuming that the subdivision is developed and houses are built at 
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where  ) (⋅ A   =   Rental value of undeveloped land at time τ and at distance  
   D from the CBD, 
  ) (⋅
∗ R   =    Equilibrium rental value of a house with lot size l, mutable  
   characteristics  H ˆ , and H
~
, and immutable characteristics H     7
   a n d   H & at distance D at time τ , 
   ) ( ˆ ⋅ C   =   Costs of building a house with lot size l and building attributes 
     H ˆ at time τ  in a subdivision with immutable characteristics H ,  
     a n d   H & . 
   ) (
~
⋅ C   =   Costs of building other non-house facilities at time τ  in a  
     subdivision  with  immutable  characteristics  H  and H & . 
  r     =    Discount rate for future revenues and costs, 
 
) , , , ,
~
, ˆ , ( t D H H H H l & Π  is the discounted net profit from an acre of the residential subdivision at 
distance D from the CBD, when a development strategy  )
~
, ˆ , ( H H l  is adopted at time  0 ≥ t .  
  The seller maximizes  ) (⋅ Π  by choosing optimal values of t, l, , ˆ H  and H
~
 for any given 
distance D, undeveloped land rent  ) (⋅ A , and immutable characteristics H  and H & . The rents 
) (⋅
∗ R  must be the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay or “bid rent” for a house built at time t, 
and distance D, with lot size l and housing characteristics  , ˆ H  in a subdivision with attributes 
H
~
 given H  and H & . An interior solution to the problem of maximizing  ) (⋅ Π  with t, l, , ˆ H  and 
H
~
  all greater than zero, would satisfy the following conditions: 
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τ d H H D t H H l R e r H H D t H H l R
t r & &  is the average future rent from 
the developed lot,  ) (⋅ i R  is the partial derivative of that rent with respect to lot size l and 
H H i
~
, ˆ ∈ . The seller is assumed to take rents  ) (⋅ A  accruing to undeveloped land as exogenous. 
  The seller solves the above first order conditions simultaneously for optimal lot size 
∗ l , 
mutable attributes 
∗ H ˆ , and 
∗ H
~
. Substituting these into the buyer’s best response function yields 
) , , , ;
~
, ˆ , ( τ D H H H H l R & ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ , which is the equilibrium rental value of a house built at time τ  at 
distance D given immutable characteristics H  and H & . This is the backwards induction 
outcome of the game, which is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The game does not 
involve noncredible threats as the seller gives no credence to threats by the buyer to respond in 
ways that will not be her self interest. When the second stage arrives; the seller anticipates that 
the buyer will respond optimally to her actions by accepting the offer.   
  The hedonic price of a residential property is the present value of the stream of future 
rents obtained from the residential use and can be expressed as  
  τ τ
τ d D H H H H l R e t D H H H H l P
t
t r ) , , , ;
~
, ˆ , ( ) , , , ,
~
, ˆ , (
) ( & & ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∞
− − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∫ =     (6) 
) (⋅
∗ P  is the sales price of a residential property which is a function of the size of the lot, all other 
mutable characteristics  )
~
, ˆ ( H H  supplied by the seller, distance from the CBD, time, and the 
immutable characteristics  ) , ( H H & . It describes the locus of equilibrium points between buyers 
and sellers in the market. The marginal implicit equilibrium price of any of the attributes can be 
found by differentiating the hedonic price function with respect to the attribute. Evaluated at an 
individual’s optimal choice, this implicit price represents the individual’s marginal willingness to 
pay for the attribute (Irwin, 2002).    9
While lot size and building attributes receive direct payments, subdivision specific 
amenities, location and neighborhood characteristics receive no direct payments. However, the 
consumer’s willingness to pay for a house is affected by these attributes. It is to be expected that 
payments increase with the desired attributes of the subdivision, location and neighborhood, and 
decrease with undesired ones. On the other hand, it is often the case that the land developers are 
constrained by some state and county policies. Therefore, we include these sorts of variables in 
our empirical hedonic analysis. The following section discusses the issues related to the 
estimation of hedonic price function.  
 
III. Estimation Issues  
  While hedonic pricing models offer a means to estimate the marginal implicit prices of 
characteristics associated with a differentiated good, such as residential property, estimation of 
such models is characterized by a variety of econometric issues.  Irwin (2002) discussed the 
problems associated with endogeneity, spatial autocorrelation, and multicollinearity including 
the questions of appropriate functional form for hedonic pricing models and the extent of the 
housing market. At this moment, we will restrict our analysis of estimation issues only to the 
question of functional form. Potential identification problems and other issues will be taken care 
up in the future. 
  Cropper, Deck, and McConnell (1988) examined how errors in measuring marginal 
attribute prices vary with the form of hedonic price function. They estimated omission of 
attributes could seriously affect the performance of those hedonic functions. Their simulation 
results suggest that when all attributes are observed, linear and quadratic functions of Box-Cox 
transformed variables provide the most accurate estimates (i.e. produces lowest mean percentage 
errors) of the marginal attribute prices. They also found that, when certain variables are not   10
observed or when a variable is replaced by proxy, a linear version of the Box-Cox transformation 
of the hedonic price function produces most robust estimates.  
Since we are hypothesizing that our estimated hedonic property value model may be 
characterized by omitted variables, we will adopt a linear Box-Cox transformation of the of the 
hedonic price function specified in equation (6). The linear Box-Cox  transformation requires the 
dependent variable to be scaled by a factor θ  such that  
θ
θ
θ 1 ) ( −
=
DEPVAR
DEPVAR        ( 7 )  
The model includes both the linear (when  1 = θ ) and semi-log (when  0 = θ ) specifications of the 
model as special cases. Likelihood ratio tests can be employed to detect whether the linear Box-
Cox specification is significantly different from the linear and semi-log formulations. We will 




Our empirical analysis depends on data obtained for 211 subdivisions with 4628 building 
lots in five Maryland counties. The data were collected from plans submitted to county land 
planning and regulatory agencies, State-maintained GIS records of taxation and assessment, 
Census 2000, and from County Public School Systems.  
The empirical study is restricted to subdivisions that have all single-family dwellings, all 
townhouses, or mixture of single family and townhouse dwellings. In order to ensure individual 
ownership of residential property, subdivisions with commercial or industrial sites or with lots 
developed for apartment buildings or condominiums are eliminated from the study. We also have 
limited the study to subdivisions with five or more building lots and to subdivisions for which 
plans were approved between 1991 and 1997.    11
An initial survey was conducted to identify all of the subdivisions that fit our residential 
use criteria. A random sample of data was collected from each county planning agency for at 
least 50 percent of these qualifying subdivisions. These data then were matched to lots and 
parcels in the Maryland Property View county databases developed and maintained by the 
Maryland State Department of Planning. This provided access to tax assessment, sales and 
Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) data files (which contain attributes of existing 
dwelling units), and to GIS data on roads, streams, and other geographical features. The planning 
and property view data were augmented by Census 2000 data on incomes and race for the census 
tract containing the subdivisions, and by school achievement scores for the schools serving the 
subdivision.  
The study area is comprised of five Maryland counties in the DC-Baltimore metropolitan 
area. These counties are Carroll, Charles, Howard, Montgomery, and Prince Georges. 
Montgomery and Prince Georges are counties with densely populated urban areas that adjoin 
Washington D.C. Subdivisions in Carroll and Charles counties are further from urban centers 
and are dispersed throughout the countryside or clustered around a county town center. Howard 
county is close to Baltimor, but many homeowners in this county work in and commute to the 
Washington D.C. metropolitan area.  
The dependent variable in the hedonic pricing model is the sales value (SALESVAL) of 
building lots obtained from Maryland Property View county databases. Observations are 
restricted to single dwelling arms length transactions of owner occupied residential properties 
that occurred within the included subdivisions between January 1992 and December 1999. This 
restriction reduces the number of observations to 4587. The independent variables used in the 
model are size of building lots (LOTSIZE) and four subsets of housing attributes. Table 1   12
provides definitions and descriptive statistics for the available observations for all of the 
variables included in the model.  
The first subset of independent variables includes building characteristics of the 
residential properties. The foundation square footage of the principal structure of the building is 
presented by BLDAREA. Employing CAMA quality of construction codes, five dummy 
variables (BLDGRADE1 – BLDGRADE5) are generated, with BLDGRADE1 representing 
“fair” quality construction and BLDGRADE5 representing “excellent” quality construction.  
Number of stories in a house is illustrated by another set of dummy variables (BLDSTORY1 – 
BLDSTORY3), with 1 for one storied house and 3 for three-storied ones. SINGLFAM and 
TOWNHS indicate whether the building is a standard single family unit or a townhouse. 
BASEMENT indicates whether the housing unit has a basement.  
Subdivision specific attributes, the primary focus of this study, are included in the second 
subset of independent variables. This subset included three measures of amenities that the 
developer/builder (the seller) can provide to enhance the profit from the subdivision. They are 
represented by three dummy variables, AMENITY1 – AMENITY3. AMENITY1 indicates the 
presence or absence of walking paths, sitting area etc., AMENITY2 shows whether there is club-
house or community center in the subdivision, and AMENITY3 stands for ball field, play 
grounds or swimming pool. In addition to these dummy variables, other subdivision attributes 
such as the percentage of total acreage that is designated as open space (PCTOAREA), and total 
area of the subdivision (SUBAREA) are also included in the model.  
Several variables are developed to measure differences in buyer bid rents caused by 
location and neighborhood features. Included measures are commuting distance to the nearest 
CBD (COMDIST), median household income (MHHINC), the percentage of African American 
population in the census block, and the quality of public schools represented by standardized test    13
Table 1. Residential Property Variables: Definitions and Summary Statistics 
                    
Variables Definition  Obs.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min.  Max. 
Dependent Variable          
            
SALESVAL  Sales value of the residential property ($10,000)  4587 24.49  14.64 3.60  415.01 
            
Independent Variables          
            
LOTSIZE  Size of building lot (acres)  4587  0.43  0.91 0.02 36.08 
            
Building Characteristics           
            
BLDAREA Foundation square footage (100 sq.ft.) 4587  2.36  1.00 0.92  9.64 
BLDGRADE1  1 if fair quality construction  4587 0.25  0.43  0.00 1.00 
BLDGRADE2  1 if average quality construction 4587  0.32 0.47  0.00  1.00 
BLDGRADE3  1 if good quality conatruction  4587 0.38  0.49  0.00 1.00 
BLDGRADE4  1 if very good quality construction  4587 0.04  0.19  0.00 1.00 
BLDGRADE5  1 if excellent quality construction 4587  0.01 0.08  0.00  1.00 
BLDSTORY1  1 if 1 storied building  4587 0.02  0.13  0.00 1.00 
BLDSTORY2  1 if 2 storied building  4587 0.88  0.32  0.00 1.00 
BLDSTORY2H  1 if 2 and half storied  building  4587 0.01  0.09  0.00 1.00 
BLDSTORY3  1 if 3 storied building  4587 0.07  0.25  0.00 1.00 
FOYER  1 if foyer  4587  0.02  0.14  0.00  1.00 
BASEMENT  1 if the building has basement 4587  0.89 0.32  0.00  1.00 
SINGLFAM  1 if the building is a std. single family unit  4587  0.61  0.49  0.00  1.00 
            
Subdivision Attributes          
            
SUBAREA  Area of the subdivision (acres)  4587 78.68  88.11 0.96  367.72 
PCTOAREA  OAREA as % of total subdivision  area  4587 48.20  23.70 0.00 91.32 
AMENITY1  1 if sub. has paths, totlots, sitting areas  4587 0.44  0.50  0.00 1.00 
AMENITY2  1 if sub. has clubhouse or community center  4587 0.02  0.12  0.00 1.00 
AMENITY3  1 if sub. has ball flds, tennis ct. or swm. pool  4587  0.29  0.46  0.00  1.00 
            
Location and Neighborhood Features          
            
PCTFMLND  Percent of agricultural land w/n half mile radius   4587  19.16  19.16  0.00  89.39 
PCTNATLND  Percent of natural land w/n half mile radius   4587 31.13  16.99 0.00 87.86 
PCTOPNURBN  Percent of open urban land w/n half mile radius   4587  2.49  5.16  0.00  33.91 
COMDIST  Commuting Distance to nearest  CBD  (miles)  4587 21.13  13.94 5.00 92.90 
MSPAP_H  High School MSPAP scores  4587  101.48  2.88  91.93  105.71 
MHHINC  Med. HH income in the census block ($10,000)  4558  8.37  2.91 0.80 20.00 
PCTAFRAM  Percent of African American in the cen. block  4558 31.90  33.30 0.00  100.00 
            
Policy Variables            
            
PUD  1 if under Planned Unit Development  4587 0.11  0.31  0.00 1.00 
TDR  1 if have Transferable Development Right  4587  0.19 0.39  0.00  1.00 
ZONMIN  Min. lot size zoning requirement  (acres)  4572 0.53  0.83  0.00 5.00 
PCTXTREE  Acres of required forestration  (%)  4587  6.45  7.77 0.00 31.50 
EXEMPT  1 if subdivision is exempt from FCA  4587  0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00 
COUNTY1  1 if the subdivision is in Carroll county  4587  0.05  0.21  0.00  1.00 
COUNTY2  1 if the subdivision is in Charles county  4587  0.15  0.35  0.00  1.00 
COUNTY3  1 if the subdivision is in Howard county  4587  0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00 
COUNTY4  1 if the subdivision is in Montgomery county  4587 0.29  0.46  0.00 1.00 
COUNTY5  1 if the subdivision is in Prince Georges county  4587 0.23  0.42  0.00 1.00 
   14
scores from the MSPAP tests given to high school students in Maryland (MSPAP_H). 
Characteristics of the land surrounding the subdivisions are represented by three location 
variables computed as percentage of land in designated uses within half mile radius of the 
subdivision centroid. These are PCTOPNURBN (area in public parks, outdoor recreation 
facilities, historic sites etc.), PCTNATLND (area in brush, forest, wet or bare land), and 
PCTFMLND (agricultural acreage).   All three of these variables can represent amenity values to 
homebuyers. Natural and farm land can also proxy for the cost of buying land for development. 
In this role, these variables will indicate the supply of nearby potentially available for 
development.  
The fourth subset of dependent variables represents some policy measures that can act as 
constraints to the sellers land development decision making. Lot size policies are represented by 
maximum density zoning restriction (ZONDENS) and minimum lot size zoning requirements 
(ZONMIN). Whether the subdivision is developed as a Planned Unit Development (PUD) and/or 
has Transferable Development Rights (TDR) may also affect supplier’s decisions. These features 
are included in the model as dummy variables. PCTXTREE represents FCA (Forest 
Conservation Act) requirement of forest (as percentage of the subdivision area) to be part of the 
subdivision. Another dummy variable (EXEMPT) indicates whether the subdivision is exempt 
from FCA. Finally, five county dummy variables (COUNTY1 – COUNTY5) are included to 
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V. Empirical Results 
  Table 2 presents results from the linear Box-Cox estimation of the hedonic pricing model. 
Parameter estimates are listed in the second column of Table 2. Column three reports the 
likelihood ratio test statistics of the null hypotheses that each of the estimated coefficients is 
equal to zero. Corresponding P-values in the fourth column shows whether the estimated 
coefficients are significant or not. A P-value of 0.05 indicates that the corresponding coefficient 
estimate is significant at 95 percent level. 
The coefficient estimate for lot size and building area are found to be highly significant 
and positive implying that the equilibrium price of housing is increasing with lot size and 
foundation area of the principal structure. All of the dummy variables representing housing 
attributes are significant at the 0.0001 level and are of the expected sign, except for those 
representing two and half storied or three storied building. Equilibrium housing price is 
increasing in total area of the subdivision, in percentage of subdivision area designated for open 
space, and in type one amenity (paths, sitting areas, etc.). Results also show that equilibrium 
residential housing price is unaffected by type two amenity (clubhouse or community center), but 
decreases with amenity type three (ball field, play ground, swimming pool).  
Parameter estimates of location and neighbor features show that equilibrium housing 
price is decreasing in commuting distance to CBD, surrounding farm and natural land, and 
proportion of African-American population in the census block. However, it is increasing in 
median household income in the census block. All of the policy variables included in the model, 
except for dummies representing Carroll and Charles counties, are significant. It cumulates 
positive value to the residential housing if the construction is under Planned Unit Development 
(PUD) criteria, and also if the developer/builder has given Transferable Development Right 
(TDR). It is found that equilibrium price of a residential property decreases with minimum lot    16
Table 2. Linear Box-Cox estimates of scale variant parameters.   
              
Variable Coef.  Estimates  L-R test Stat.  Prob > chi2(df)  df of chi2 
       
CONSTANT 2.1294       
LOTSIZE 0.1276  187.29  0.0000  1 
       
Building Characteristics      
        
BLDAREA 0.1840  1118.76  0.0000  1 
BLDGRADE2 0.0923  104.08  0.0000  1 
BLDGRADE3 0.3213  547.29  0.0000  1 
BLDGRADE4 0.5446  759.81  0.0000  1 
BLDGRADE5 0.5184  230.57  0.0000  1 
BLDSTORY2 0.0395  4.74  0.0290  1 
BLDSTORY2H -0.0060  0.03  0.8540  1 
BLDSTORY3 -0.0074  0.09  0.7660  1 
FOYER 0.2455  81.89  0.0000  1 
BASEMENT 0.0346  5.38 0.0200  1 
SINGLFAM 0.1589  337.29 0.0000  1 
       
Subdivision Attributes      
        
SUBAREA 0.0003  28.87  0.0000  1 
PCTOAREA 0.0011  57.03  0.0000  1 
AMENITY1 0.0139  2.82  0.0930  1 
AMENITY2 0.0019  0.01  0.9390  1 
AMENITY3 -0.0276  6.27  0.0120  1 
       
Location and Neighborhood Features      
        
PCTFMLND -0.0011  33.44  0.0000  1 
PCTNATLND -0.0004  3.29  0.0700  1 
PCTOPNURBN -0.0004  0.42  0.5180  1 
COMDIST -0.0471  23.42  0.0000  1 
MSPAP_H -0.0005  0.06 0.8140  1 
MHHINC 0.0076  31.04  0.0000  1 
PCTAFRAM -0.0008  15.67  0.0000  1 
       
Policy Variables        
        
PUD 0.0435  12.30  0.0000  1 
TDR 0.0221  3.02  0.0820  1 
ZONMIN -0.0777  15.17  0.0000  1 
PCTXTREE 0.0032  69.97  0.0000  1 
EXEMPT 0.0165  4.49  0.0340  1 
COUNTY1 0.0290  1.99  0.1590  1 
COUNTY2 -0.0124  0.53  0.4670  1 
COUNTY3 -0.0938  26.30  0.0000  1 
COUNTY4 -0.1012  28.31  0.0000  1 
       
Transformation Parameters    No. of Obs.  4543 
THETA -0.0743    Log-likelihood  -12784.256 
SIGMA  0.1480     LR Chi sq. (35)  8156.62000 
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size zoning requirement.  Surprisingly, required forestation (acres) as a percentage of the total 
site acreage and exemption from the FCA both show to have positive effect on equilibrium 
housing price.  
The dependent variable (SALESVAL) is transformed following the formula in equation 
(7); the estimated value of the transformation parameter θ  is (-0.0743). Likelihood ratio test 
statistics rejects the null hypotheses of  1 = θ  and   0 = θ  implying that linear and semi-log 
specifications would be incorrect. The mean value of the dependent variable after transformation 
is 2.744.   
In order to capture the marginal effects of a continuous variable, corresponding elasticity 
are computed using the coefficient estimates, mean value of the transformed dependent variable, 
and the mean value of the independent variable. This gives an estimate of elasticity at the mean 
which is used to predict the change in the transformed dependent variable. Finally, using the 
formula in equation (7), the change in the transformed variable is converted in terms of original 
dependent variable. This measure gives the marginal change in the sales value of a residential 
property for a one percent change in each of the continuous dependent variables. For example, 
the linear Box-Cox model provides an estimated elasticity (at the mean) of -0.0003 for the 
change in equilibrium price of residential housing with respect to the change in the percentage of 
open space in the subdivision. This elasticity implies that a marginal increase in the percentage 
of open space would increase the average price ($215,139) of the residential properties by 
$15,027.  
The marginal effects of the dummy variables are calculated in a similar fashion but 
employing the coefficient estimate instead of elasticity. It allows us to estimate the effect of the 
presence of certain attributes on the mean value of the residential property. For example,   18
provision of subdivision amenity type one, paths and/or sitting areas, increases the average 
residential property value by $10,574 
  Finally, four restricted models, each excluding one subset of independent variables, are 
also estimated employing the same technique. Likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypotheses 
that any of these subsets of housing attributes is not significant as a whole. Moreover, parameter 
estimates show that omission of any specific subset of variables produces biases in the estimates 
of the rest of the coefficients. Since our primary concern is the set of subdivision specific 
attributes, the estimation results of the restricted model without such attributes are presented in 
Table 3. 
While omission of subdivision specific attributes changes the magnitudes of coefficient 
estimates of the included variables, compared to the unrestricted model, it does not change the 
sign of the coefficient estimates of the retained variables. However, exclusion of such variables 
makes dummy variables for two-storied building, distance to CBD, and minimum lot size 
requirement insignificant which were significant in the unrestricted model. On the other hand, 
the coefficient estimates for the proportion of open urban land within half mile radius and for the 
dummy variable indicating Charles county become significant in the restricted model. Thus, 
omission of variables measuring subdivision attributes produces biased marginal values for other 
attributes 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion 
This study attempts to test the hypothesis that subdivision specific amenities significantly 
affect residential property values. A hedonic pricing model, derived from a dynamic game 
theoretic setting, is employed to test the hypothesis. A linear Box-Cox specification of the 
hedonic housing pricing model, with housing sales price as a function of lot size and other    19
Table 3. Linear Box-Cox estimation results of the restricted model  
             (without subdivision specific attributes) 
              
Variable  Coef. Estimates  L-R test Stat.  Prob > chi2(df)  df of chi2 
       
CONSTANT 1.8526     
LOTSIZE 0.1116 173.60 0.0000 1 
       
Building Characteristics      
        
BLDAREA 0.1819 1261.31 0.0000 1 
BLDGRADE2 0.0848 113.49 0.0000 1 
BLDGRADE3 0.2980 559.33 0.0000 1 
BLDGRADE4 0.4954 736.39 0.0000 1 
BLDGRADE5 0.4819 224.60 0.0000 1 
BLDSTORY2 0.0443 6.47 0.0110 1 
BLDSTORY2H -0.0044 0.02 0.8890 1 
BLDSTORY3 -0.0092 0.16 0.6910 1 
FOYER 0.2082 64.75 0.0000 1 
BASEMENT 0.0419 8.73 0.0030 1 
SINGLFAM 0.1273 248.23 0.0000 1 
       
Location and Neighborhood Features      
        
PCTFMLND -0.0009 26.52 0.0000 1 
PCTNATLND -0.0007 11.56 0.0010 1 
PCTOPNURBN -0.0012 5.44 0.0200 1 
COMDIST -0.0090 1.13 0.2880 1 
MSPAP_H 0.0016 0.84 0.3580 1 
MHHINC 0.0060 23.77 0.0000 1 
PCTAFRAM -0.0006 9.74 0.0020 1 
       
Policy Variables        
        
PUD 0.0253 5.86 0.0160 1 
TDR -0.0196 5.01 0.0250 1 
ZONMIN -0.0059 2.18 0.1400 1 
PCTXTREE 0.0023 43.80 0.0000 1 
EXEMPT 0.0223 9.13 0.0030 1 
COUNTY1 -0.0312 2.69 0.1010 1 
COUNTY2 -0.0692 23.88 0.0000 1 
COUNTY3 -0.0786 23.88 0.0000 1 
COUNTY4 -0.1420 71.46 0.0000 1 
       
Transformation Parameters      
      No. of Obs.  4543 
THETA -0.0934   Log-likelihood  -12907.404 
SIGMA  0.1434    LR Chi sq. (35)  7910.32000 
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housing attributes, is estimated. Different housing attributes are grouped into four subsets: 
building characteristics, subdivision attributes, location and neighborhood features, and policy 
variables. The empirical analysis is carried out using data obtained for 211 subdivisions with 
4628 building lots in five Maryland counties. 
Empirical results show that variables measuring subdivision specific amenities 
significantly affect residential housing property values, and omission of such variables produces 
biased coefficient estimates for other measures. In particular, it is found that housing price is 
increasing in open space provided within the subdivision, and in amenity type one indicating 
whether the subdivision has walking paths and/or sitting areas. It is also increasing with the area 
of the subdivision. 
This is a working paper that reports preliminary findings. While estimation of hedonic 
pricing models is characterized by econometric issues, such as endogeneity, spatial 
autocorrelation, and multicollinearity, and functional form, the empirical analysis take accounts 
of the last two of the issues. Other issues, along with potential identification problems, will be 
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